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This paper is written in response to John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle, whose article, 
‘The Case Against a “Critical Terrorism Studies”’, appeared in the last issue of this journal. I 
welcome the opportunity to respond, and will focus on those issues they raised that relate to 
state terrorism as used or sponsored by liberal democratic states of the Global North, which I 
had previously argued should be prioritised as a research agenda within Critical Terrorism 
Studies (CTS) (Blakeley 2007a). I will also attempt to respond to some of their broader 
concerns. I will begin by clarifying what I mean by liberal democratic states of the Global 
North, and outlining the significance of these states in relation to state terrorism.  
The states to which I am referring are states that tend to identify themselves with each 
other based on similar political systems, in which it is claimed that the rights of the individual 
are upheld within a democratic system, and where economics are based on free market 
principles. These states tend to be relatively well off and are largely situated in the Northern 
Hemisphere, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand. Recently within IR, the term 
‘Global North’ has been used to describe this grouping of states. The terms ‘North’ and 
‘South’, were first adopted by the Brandt Commission to move away from notions of East 
and West which became redundant with the end of the Cold War. As the Commission argued, 
‘in general terms, and although neither is a uniform or permanent grouping, “North” and 
“South” are broadly synonymous with “rich” and “poor”, “developed” and 
“developing”’(Brandt Commission 1990, p. 31). The terms ‘Global North’ and ‘Global 
South’ are terms that have been deployed to go beyond a simple geographical dichotomy, and 
beyond a state-centric approach that precludes class differences from our conceptions of the 
differences within and between states, regions and hemispheres (Sklair 2002). These terms 
are used to denote an appreciation of the fact that there are minority areas and peoples within 
the South whose experience and history identifies them more closely with particular elites 
within the North. Likewise, there are minority areas and peoples within the North whose 
experience of exploitation, marginalisation and oppression is more akin to that of the majority 
of people situated in the South.  
This is significant for studies on the use of state terrorism for two reasons. Firstly, in 







their own people, the experience of those victims is likely to mirror experiences of 
populations in the Global South where most state terrorism occurs. Secondly, while state 
terrorism has often involved the use of terror by a state of the Global South against its own 
people, as in the case of the Latin American dictatorships of the Cold War, it is not 
uncommon for such states to enjoy support for their practices from an external state from the 
Global North. In other words, the elites of a Global North and a Global South state may be 
complicit in terrorising groups of people that are specifically singled out within the Southern 
state. It is worth noting that not all liberal democratic states have been complicit in using and 
sponsoring state terrorism. As Peter Lawler has argued, certain middle power democracies 
such as New Zealand, Sweden, Canada, Norway, and Finland, among others, have never 
officially sanctioned repression overseas. Their foreign policies have tended to reflect a 
commitment to a humane internationalism which differs markedly from ‘the muscular 
militarism’ most recently exercised in the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq (Lawler 
2005, pp. 428, 436). The historical record shows that liberal democratic states such as the US, 
UK and France have regularly sponsored state terrorism within states of the Global South, 
and the widespread involvement of many European states in the policy of extraordinary 
rendition, discussed below, is indicative of the fact that even middle power countries not 
renowned for using or sponsoring state terrorism may nevertheless be complicit. While these 
forms of state terrorism are largely absent from debate, CTS is making headway in 
overcoming this silence within the discipline. 
In this paper I first address the claim that the call for a greater emphasis on state 
terrorism by liberal democratic states in terrorism studies constitutes a ‘reinventing of the 
wheel’. I show that there continues to be a selective application of definitions of terrorism so 
that state terrorism in which liberal democratic states are complicit continues to be widely 
ignored. This results in considerable gaps in the literature, which I identify. In so doing, I 
show that a credible research agenda exists and should be pursued, and that that this goes 
well beyond simply reinventing the wheel. I then show that the absence of state terrorism by 
liberal democratic states from debate results from a complex range of factors that influence 
scholars across the social sciences, which I discuss in detail. I then show that CTS scholars 
are already embarking on research that will help overcome the gaps in the literature, and that 
such work is being complemented by the work of other scholars from various social science 
disciplines. Finally I address the question raised by Horgan and Boyle concerning the 
transparency of scholars associated with CTS. I show that certainly where work on state 
terrorism by liberal democratic states is concerned, an explicit aim is to explore the use of 
state terrorism within the broader context of the foreign policy objectives of liberal 
democratic states. Those objectives have consistently involved widening access to resources 
and markets in the Global South, and competing for political and economic dominance. 
Scholars involved in work on state terrorism have been and continue to be transparent about 
this, arguing that the use of state terrorism only makes sense within this wider context. In 
addressing this I comment briefly on the question of emancipation, which Horgan and Boyle 
argue has not been adequately explained by CTS scholars, to show that a priority of those 
working on state terrorism by liberal democratic states should be to challenge foreign policy 
practices that involve state terrorism and other forms of repression. 
 
Reinventing the wheel? 
 
An important aim of scholars associating with the CTS agenda is to foster further 
studies on state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the Global North, since this has 







relatively little attention among terrorism scholars within IR, as well as across the social 
sciences. Horgan and Boyle have suggested that such calls constitute a ‘reinventing of the 
wheel’, because they associate those calls with criticisms that CTS scholars have made of 
how terrorism has been defined, which, they argue, is simply going over old ground. 
Furthermore, they point out that many terrorism scholars do acknowledge that the state is ‘a 
primary, if not the most important, agent of terror’ (Horgan and Boyle 2008, p. 56), and that 
in this regard, it is not clear how CTS is offering anything novel. My contention here is 
firstly, that it is not the definitions of terrorism that are being challenged so much as their 
applications, and secondly, that acknowledging that states, including Northern democratic 
ones, are perpetrators of terror does not adequately overcome the dearth of research in this 
area. In this regard, CTS does offer something original, since it goes well beyond simply re-
working definitions, or acknowledging the complicity of liberal democratic states in state 
terrorism. It establishes a credible research agenda and begins the analytical work that is 
needed. This includes, as I will show below, identifying incidents of Northern state terrorism, 
situating them within a taxonomy of all forms of political violence, analysing their origins 
and purposes, identifying which state actors are involved, and assessing their impacts, within 
the context of wider foreign policy objectives.    
It is the case that to label acts of repression ‘state terrorism’, they need to be consistent 
with accepted definitions of terrorism, and that if state actions fall outside of that remit, they 
should be understood as another form of political violence. This is not to say that there is a 
consensus on even the key elements of the definition of terrorism, but that there is a group of 
themes that do overlap. Nevertheless, I have found that many acts of violence committed by 
Northern democracies do fit existing definitions of terrorism, and that in turn, existing 
definitions are more than adequate for encompassing acts of terror committed by the state. 
One aspect of my own work has been to explore whether the use of torture constitutes a form 
of state terrorism and I conclude that in some circumstances it does (Blakeley 2007b). Yet 
Horgan and Boyle argue that ‘the underlying point of the CTS critique of current definitions 
of terrorism appears to be that many other forms of violence – for example, state terrorism – 
fall out of conventional definitions of terrorism’ (Horgan and Boyle 2008, p. 56). This has not 
been my experience, and neither has it been my intention to rework definitions of terrorism, 
since, as they note, numerous terrorism scholars have explored the many problems associated 
with defining and conceptualising terrorism, and have come up with definitions that are 
adequate. Indeed, as work by Christopher Mitchell, Michael Stohl, David Carleton and 
George Lopez shows, accepted definitions do not in and of themselves preclude actions by 
states. They argue that to be labelled terrorism, acts carried out either by the state or by non-
state actors must involve ‘purposive behavior or intention on the part of the “terrorist actor”’; 
‘the act or threat of violent harm to a victim(s)’; ‘observation of the effects of the act or harm 
by some ultimate target(s)’; ‘identification by the target with the victim’; ‘some degree of 
terror induced in the target(s) through a “demonstration effect” and the act of identification’; 
‘altered behavior (“compellance”) or abandoned behaviour (“deterrence”) as a direct result of 
the terrorist demonstration’(Mitchell et al. 1986, p. 5). This definition is distinguished from 
other forms of coercion and violence by the intention of the actor and the direction of the 
attempt to influence, in the sense that any actor deploying the strategy ‘must have the 
intention of inducing extreme fear in some population of observers as the main objective for 
the strategy to count as “true” terrorism’ (Mitchell et al. 1986, p. 6). Similarly, as I have 
previously discussed (Blakeley 2007a), the definition offered by Paul Wilkinson (1992, pp. 
228-229), and repeated widely by IR scholars, does not preclude the state as a perpetrator.   
Nevertheless, I have previously critiqued the application of these definitions, which has 







terrorism committed by non-state groups. This has led to little attention being paid to the use 
of state terrorism by the powerful states in the Global North, particularly in the Global South. 
Challenging how definitions of terrorism are applied formed the basis of my brief critique of 
work by Paul Wilkinson (Blakeley 2007a). Horgan and Boyle insist that Wilkinson does 
acknowledge that states are the greatest perpetrators of terror, and that he has pointed to the 
complicity of the US in sponsoring state terrorism in Central and Latin America to illustrate 
this. Occasional acknowledgements on Wilkinson’s part do not constitute a research agenda. 
Indeed, Wilkinson indicated that in his own work, ‘repressive state terror does not receive 
any detailed comparative analysis,’ primarily because ‘the subject of revolutionary and sub-
revolutionary terror is already vast’ (Wilkinson 1974, p. 43). Similarly, Leonard Weinberg 
and William Lee Eubank contend in this issue that orthodox scholars have examined state 
terrorism by Northern states against their own people, pointing to the example of Italian state 
terrorism in the 1970s. Yet this does not alter the fact that the vast majority of work on 
terrorism continues to focus on that perpetrated by non-state actors or by authoritarian 
regimes. Indeed as Weinberg and Eubank note, work on state terrorism in Stalin’s Russia, 
Mao’s China, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, and in communist regimes in Eastern Europe is extensive. 
However, as I show below, terrorism as used or sponsored in the Global South by liberal 
democratic states from the Global North continues to receive very little attention.  
Unfortunately, among those scholars that acknowledge state terrorism by liberal 
democratic states, most take the same position as Wilkinson – that its study is necessary, but 
not for them. This has shaped the work undertaken by terrorism scholars, and goes some way 
to explaining why state terrorism was left out of the world’s leading database on terrorism, 
developed by the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at St 
Andrew’s University, in collaboration with the RAND Corporation (Blakeley 2007a). There 
is also very little scholarly literature published in the key journals that discusses the use of 
state terrorism by liberal democratic states. Indeed, Andrew Silke’s review of 490 articles in 
the core terrorism studies journals from 1990 to 1999 reveals that only 12 articles, fewer than 
two percent, examined state terrorism at all (Silke 2004a, p. 206). Of these an even smaller 
subset will have addressed state terrorism by liberal democracies. This is also reflected in the 
programme for the 2008 International Studies Association Annual Convention. From the 
programme I identified 173 papers on terrorism or the ‘War on Terror’, of which just six 
were on state terrorism. Of these six, four were concerned with state terrorism by liberal 
democracies, and all four were on a panel which I convened on the subject of state terrorism. 
Of the remaining two, one was entitled ‘Why a state can’t be a terrorist’, and it is not clear 
whether the other is concerned with state terrorism by liberal democracies.    
State terrorism by liberal democratic states therefore continues to be an elephant in the 
room, even though there are numerous cases of such states using and sponsoring state 
terrorism, along with other forms of repression. Contrary to Horgan and Boyle’s argument, 
there are significant gaps in the literature on the complicity of liberal democratic states in 
state terrorism. Filling those gaps goes well beyond reinventing the wheel, and constitutes a 
clear and credible research agenda. Here I point to a number of those gaps which demand 
new research, although this is by no means an exhaustive list. Questions remain about the 
continuing support by the US for Colombia’s armed forces, which are known to have used 
state terrorism widely. Indeed, as Doug Stokes (2005) has argued, US complicity in state 
terrorism in Colombia constitutes a ‘war of terror’. The US also continues to provide 
extensive training to military forces all over the world, the nature of which is not fully known 
since much of it is classified, although the past record of the US in this regard does not paint 
a promising picture, since its counterinsurgency training for its own and overseas forces 







America (Blakeley 2006, 2007b; McClintock 1992, 2001). Further work needs to be done to 
explore whether current training is in any way linked to state terrorism. There is scope 
therefore for establishing a counter-terrorism database, which records incidents in which 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency activities have resulted in violations of human 
rights among civilians (Kurtulus 2007). The full extent of US abuses of human rights in the 
‘War on Terror’ invite further work, including assessing the policy of extraordinary rendition, 
in which other democratic states, especially in Europe, are complicit (Grey 2006). This may 
well fit the definition of state terrorism, but as yet, there has been no detailed work to explore 
it within a taxonomy of forms of political violence. With US and British forces involved in 
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, and NATO forces involved in the same in Afghanistan, 
and given what we already know about the repressive nature of US counterinsurgency 
strategies during the Cold War, there is a need for work to determine whether current 
operations also involve acts of state terrorism and pose the same threats to human rights. Any 
analysis of these issues by IR scholars would be further strengthened through engagement 
with scholars from disciplines across the social sciences, discussed in more detail below.  
 
Why is state terrorism by liberal democratic states marginalised? 
 
Even though state terrorism is far more destructive than non-state terrorism, and has 
often been sponsored by liberal democratic states from the Global North both at home and in 
the Global South, very few scholars within the social sciences have studied it. There are 
multiple and complex reasons why scholars across the social sciences have instead chosen to 
explore terrorism committed by non-state actors or so-called ‘rogue states’. The term ‘rogue 
states’ has been used as a tool of propaganda by leaders of liberal democratic states to refer to 
states it considers to be hostile. However, as has been argued by scholars including Eric 
Herring (2000) and Noam Chomsky (2004), the term could also be used to describe the US. 
The reasons why scholars tend to focus on terrorism by non-state actors or specific ‘rogue 
states’, invariably situated in the Global South, can be divided into two categories: 
methodological and motivational. The combination of these reasons has been a powerful 
force in shaping the parameters of debate, resulting in state terrorism by liberal democratic 
states being almost completely absent from scholarship within the social sciences. In 
outlining some of them here, I hope to shed light on why many scholars across the social 




There are certain peculiarities within each of the social science disciplines that have 
contributed to the marginalisation of state terrorism. These relate to whether and how 
attempts are made to define terrorism and state terrorism, and how those definitions are then 
applied, if at all. Very few sociologists have studied state terrorism, primarily because there 
has been little work within sociology on terrorism more broadly (Gibbs 1989; Turk 2004). 
Because labelling acts as terrorism promotes condemnation of the actors involved, definitions 
of terrorism, Jack Gibbs (1989, pp.329-330) argues, may reflect political or ideological bias. 
Conceptualising terrorism therefore requires an assessment of competing definitions in 
relation to specific problems associated with terrorism, including whether the state can be a 
perpetrator of terrorism. Yet there has been a general indifference on the part of most 
sociologists to conceptualising terrorism. This, according to Gibbs, results from an insistence 
within sociology that a distinction should be maintained between substantive theory and 







of conceptual problems. Gibbs argues that instead, these should go hand in hand, because 
detailed conceptualisations would enable the development of a definition of terrorism that 
was empirically applicable, and this in turn could result in the development of a sophisticated 
theory of terrorism. Over 15 years after Gibbs set out his agenda for further research on 
terrorism within sociology, Austin Turk (2004) echoed this call. This suggests that progress 
in sociology has been limited.  
There has also been a lack of engagement with the question of state terrorism by liberal 
democratic states within criminology, a discipline born out of sociology. While this may in 
part be due to the lack of will to conceptualise terrorism, as in sociology, it also has to do 
with the purpose of the discipline itself, which is to study crime. It is the state itself that 
defines what is criminal, so the parameters of study for the discipline are therefore set by the 
state – criminologists study what the state has determined is criminal (Green and Ward 2004, 
p. 1; 2005, p. 432). Indeed, as international law scholarship shows us, states themselves have 
been very reluctant to have state terrorism defined as a separate category. In this regard, 
states have successfully prevented the criminalisation of state terrorism under international 
law. As Tal Becker shows, during the Cold War most Western states rejected the notion that 
government violence could be classified as state terrorism and argued that the resort to 
violence by the military forces of a state was adequately regulated under international law 
(Becker 2006, p. 91). More recent efforts to incorporate state terrorism into the UN Charter’s 
definition of terrorism, thereby giving it international recognition, were thwarted by the UN 
Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004, which 
argued that it had not found the claims for the codification of state terrorism within the UN 
Charter ‘to be compelling’. It therefore recommended that, based on the language of UN 
Resolution 1566, the definition of terrorism adopted should provide the following description 
of terrorism: 
…any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on 
aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) 
that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when 
the purpose of such an act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate a population or 
compels a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act (UN 2004). 
As Becker concludes, this means that ‘terrorism is to be generally understood as an act 
perpetrated by a non-State actor that is designed to intimidate a population or to achieve a 
political objective through the intentional infliction of harm’ (Becker 2006, p. 88). Since the 
state, or in this case states, have determined that state terrorism should not exist as a category 
which can be codified, it is not surprising that scholars concerned with crime tend not to 
study state terrorism as such. There are some notable exceptions, including Penny Green and 
Tony Ward (2004; 2005), Ronald Kramer and Raymond Michalowski (2005), Jude 
McCulloch and Sharon Pickering (2005), Ruth Jamieson and Kieran McEvoy (2005), 
William Chambliss (1989), and Eugene McLaughlin and John Muncie (2001).  
Interestingly, Green and Ward, leading criminologists who have sought to promote the 
study of state crime, including state terrorism by liberal democratic states, within the 
discipline, have concluded that key inputs to the study of state crime have been made not by 
criminologists but by political scientists, IR scholars and anthropologists (Green and Ward 
2005, p. 431). Certainly anthropologist Jeff Sluka (2000) has made an important contribution 
with regard to state terrorism, but he too has lamented the lack of engagement within the 
discipline of anthropology, citing a fellow anthropologist, Linda Green, in the preface to his 







Overwhelming empirical evidence demonstrates that state violence has been standard 
operating procedure in numerous societies where anthropologists have conducted 
fieldwork over the past three decades. Despite an alarming rise in the most blatant forms of 
transgression, repression and state terrorism, the topic has not captured the anthropological 
imagination (Green in Sluka 2000). 
Fears among anthropologists of the consequences of research in this area may be a factor in 
the lack of anthropological studies on state terrorism, discussed in more detail below. A 
minority of politics and international relations scholars have similarly expressed concern 
about the absence of state terrorism, particularly by liberal democratic states from the Global 
North, from their own discipline. Yet a review of the work carried out on state terrorism by a 
minority of scholars from anthropology, criminology and sociology indicates that they draw 
extensively on the small body of work that has emerged within IR which assesses state 
terrorism by liberal democratic states. This may be because of the focus of much IR 
scholarship on the activities of states, even if the majority of that work where terrorism is 
concerned focuses on threats to the state. By contrast, other disciplines within the social 
sciences tend to focus on actors other than states or specific institutions within the state. The 
fact that scholars from other disciplines have found work from IR so useful where state 
terrorism is concerned is testament to the achievements of a small number of IR scholars who 
have developed a robust research agenda that has gained respect. There is nevertheless much 
work to be done to update the work that was begun in the late 1970s and 1980s by Edward 
Herman (1985), Noam Chomsky and Herman (1979a; 1979b), Alexander George (1991) and 
Stohl and Lopez (1984), and certainly the ways in which definitions of terrorism are applied 
within IR, as discussed above, continue to hamper progress in this area.  
In addition to definitional and conceptualisation issues, the availability of data on 
terrorism further contributes to a lack of debate on state terrorism within the social sciences. 
The main sources of data on incidents of terrorism are governments or government-sponsored 
academic institutions and think tanks (Herman and O'Sullivan 1989, p. 69). Therefore, while 
liberal democratic states are willing to invest heavily to produce data on terrorist incidents 
and threats against their own interests, discussed in more detail below, obtaining data on acts 
of terrorism committed by those states is extremely difficult, since only very infrequently do 
they advertise their terrorist activities or intent (Chambliss 1989, pp. 203-204; Gibbs 1989, p. 
330; Mitchell et al. 1986, p. 2; Nicholson 1986, p. 31). Indeed in most cases governments 
seek to conceal the extent to which they use terrorism, and when such activities are exposed, 
they tend to be justified as ‘necessary measures’ or more benignly as ‘police action’ (Mitchell 
et al. 1986, pp. 2-3; Nicholson 1986, p. 31). When such activities are exposed, and presented 
as something other than state terrorism, considerable analytical effort is required to determine 
whether such an act does constitute state terrorism, since they are unlikely to be included in 
the major data sets of terrorist incidents.  
 
The Roles, Motives and Interests of Academics    
 
The problems relating to methodology may be further exacerbated by the motives of 
academics themselves. In a minority of cases, research into state terrorism can be physically 
dangerous, particularly when it involves field work in areas where state terrorism has 
occurred, as anthropologist Jeff Sluka  notes in the preface to his edited volume, which brings 
together work by a panel of international anthropologists that have all undertaken research in 
areas ‘marked by extreme forms of state repression and terror’, and who may or have already 
suffered recriminations as a result (Sluka 2000, pp. ix-x). Indeed Myrna Mack, a renowned 







Guatemala under the successive US-backed military regimes from 1954 until the early 1990s, 
was herself stalked for two weeks by a military death squad before her assassination on 11 
September 1990 (Human Rights First 2003). In most cases, scholars do not have to contend 
with such threats to their personal safety, but this does not make their fears of such threats 
any less real. There may also be other reasons for their silence on the subject. 
It could be that scholars are travelling the road most travelled. Since terrorism is 
perceived in policy and academic circles to be an issue of considerable concern, they may 
simply be responding to the perceived need for research in this area. It could also be that 
scholars are simply oblivious to state terrorism by liberal democratic states as a research area 
for the same reason that many scholars explore non-state terrorism – this concern dominates 
the discipline, whereas there is little work available on state terrorism by liberal democracies 
so it does not occur to academics to pursue it. Or it could be that scholars consider this to be 
work that is already being carried out, particularly if they are aware of the few titles that have 
emerged in recent years on state terrorism in Latin America during the Cold War, or on US 
conduct in the ‘War on Terror’, with specific reference to torture at Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo Bay. This may be why Wilkinson acknowledged but did not take up the subject 
himself. 
On the other hand, it could be that scholars are deterred from undertaking work that 
assesses the complicity of liberal democratic governments in state terrorism, because 
individual academics deem the associated costs to themselves to be too high. Sometimes their 
job (on which their livelihood depends) exists to undertake work aimed at helping protect the 
state by assessing threats against liberal democratic states. This does not mean to say that 
they are actively deterred from undertaking work on state terrorism. Indeed, it is not difficult 
to get panels and papers on the subject accepted for inclusion in the programmes of leading 
academic conferences. A further reason for the relative silence on state terrorism by liberal 
democracies may be that even though individuals recognise that states are complicit in 
terrorism, they find this uncomfortable, and would prefer not to have to confront the awkward 
conclusions that research on state terrorism by liberal democratic states might lead to.   
Frequently, individual academics are employed by governments, directly through think 
tanks and government institutions, and indirectly through government funding councils, to 
undertake research into terrorist threats against the state, or to advise governments on how to 
counter such threats, as in the case of RAND and the CSTPV, discussed above. Indeed 
considerable government funding has been made available for such research in the years 
since 9/11 in the US and the UK, and is therefore guided by government agendas and policy 
concerns (Silke 2004b, p. 58). US and UK governments have a captive audience among IR 
academics faced with increasing pressures to secure external funding for research, in light of 
which they can and will meet government demands for data and analysis of groups 
considered to be a threat to national security. This does not preclude those academics from 
being critical of unpopular foreign policy choices that they argue have helped generate 
terrorism, as Horgan and Boyle (2008, p. 5) point out. Indeed Frank Gregory and Paul 
Wilkinson (2005), in their assessment of Britain’s performance in the ‘War on Terror’, 
funded by the ESRC and published by Chatham House, are critical of the junior rather than 
partnership role that Britain has taken in the ‘War on Terror’, pointing out that ‘Riding pillion 
with a powerful ally has proved costly in terms of British and US military lives, Iraqi lives, 
military expenditure, and the damage caused to the counter-terrorism campaign’. Such 
critique stems from the fact that many IR academics are motivated by a wish to contribute to 
security and peace, and in the course of their research on terrorism, they are willing to speak 







The close links between liberal democratic governments and academics undertaking 
such research has nevertheless impacted on the field of terrorism studies, in that it further 
privileges work on threats by non-state actors against democratic states and their interests, 
and marginalises work that examines the complicity of those states in terrorism. This can be 
illustrated with reference to the RAND Corporation. In addition to Wilkinson, various 
academic experts on terrorism have close links to RAND, which in turn has significant 
affiliations with members of the current US administration, including Donald Rumsfeld 
(Flynn 2005) and Condoleeza Rice (National Security Council 2004), both former RAND 
Board members. Other leading academics associated with both RAND and the CSTPV are 
Bruce Hoffman, who temporarily left the RAND Corporation in 1993 to found the CSTPV at 
St Andrew’s, and who remains an honorary senior researcher of the CSTPV, and Brian 
Jenkins, a senior analyst with RAND, who is also a member of the CSTPV’s advisory council 
(Burnett and Whyte 2005, p. 8). These connections have a significant effect upon terrorism 
studies. As Burnett and Whyte point out, individuals associated with the CSTPV and RAND 
retain key editorial positions in the two most prominent English language journals in the field 
of terrorism and political violence: Wilkinson as co-editor of Terrorism and Political 
Violence; Hoffman and Jenkins as members of its editorial Board; and Hoffman as editor in 
chief of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, a journal originally founded and editorially 
managed by RAND (Burnett and Whyte 2005, p. 9). The dominance of research on non-state 
terrorism is a product of the agenda setting by policymakers where their own complicity in 
terrorism is ignored and threats to the states that they represent are prioritised.  
Even those scholars not affiliated with such institutions and government bodies shy 
away from studying state terrorism by liberal democratic states because it is uncomfortable 
and even dangerous. For most people, the question they tend to ask in relation to terrorism is 
how they can protect themselves. If they start to look at the complicity of liberal democratic 
states in terrorism, however, they are forced to admit that, as Michael Nicholson  argues, their 
own government, which ideologically they support, is involved in atrocities (Nicholson 1986, 
p. 35). It is, therefore, psychologically more comfortable not to get involved in this kind of 
research, and instead to engage in research that helps to overcome problems faced by the 
state. This is the conclusion reached by Neil Smith in a review of a collection of Noam 
Chomsky’s essays, where he argues that opinion on Chomsky’s work is polarised precisely 
because of this discomfort:  
Reading that your revered leaders are ruthless hypocrites is painful and calls for action. 
Any such action would involve sacrificing both leisure and certain aspects of privilege and 
power. It’s easier to deny the claims, accept the power structure and assume that we are 
uniquely right with a divine mission in the world (Smith 2008). 
As discussed above, various scholars acknowledge state terrorism, even if they choose not to 
study it, but for some, it is possible that they would prefer not to face these facts. This helps 
to explain the predominance within terrorism studies of problem-solving theory (Gunning 
2007), described by Robert Cox as theory that ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the 
prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, 
as the given framework for action’ (Cox 1981, p. 128).  The aim of the theory is, therefore, 
‘to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with 
particular sources of trouble’ (Cox 1981, pp. 128-129). For terrorism studies scholars, the aim 
of the work is not to challenge these institutions and power relations, but to consider the 
problem of terrorism within the context of these existing institutions and power dynamics. 
Because realist and liberal approaches within IR scholarship have carried significant weight, 







The same is true of the field of Security Studies, as Richard Wyn Jones has argued, and the 
problems he highlights are applicable to terrorism studies. The state is the only significant 
actor for these approaches, and its security is paramount (Wyn Jones; 1999, pp. 94-102). This 
results in a fetishization of the state (Wyn Jones 1999, p.96) whereby the security of 
individuals is ‘subsumed under the ambit of the state’, and is frequently ‘sacrificed to the 
demands of realpolitik’ (Stamnes and Wyn Jones 2000). This emphasis on state security, 
when coupled with the close ties between academic experts and the state at the height of the 
Cold War, meant that ‘Security Studies, implicitly or explicitly, generated information and 
analysis for states, and specifically for the ruling elites within them’ (Stamnes and Wyn Jones 
2000). Not surprisingly, these dominant approaches tend to accept the benign character of the 
foreign policies of Northern democratic states. At worst, when such states use force, it is 
assumed that this is in response to credible threats, or as a means of protecting other, weaker 
states or groups. This is beginning to change, since a number of scholars associated with 
realism, for example Walt (2005), and liberalism, for example Ikenberry (2006), have 
published works that critique US practices in the ‘War on Terror’, but there is still much to be 
done. Horgan and Boyle  raised concerns over my statement that critically oriented  scholars 
‘need to reclaim the term “terrorism”’, which they claimed I was arguing should be used to 
‘show the abuses of “Northern democracies”’ (Horgan and Boyle 2008, p. 55). My actual 
argument was that ‘critically oriented scholars need to reclaim the term “terrorism” and use it 
as an analytical tool, rather than a political tool in the service of elite power’ (Blakeley 2007a, 
p. 233). Even though individual scholars do not necessarily set out to marginalise the study of 
state terrorism by their governments, the consequence of their decisions, which in turn are 
often the result of the agenda setting of policymakers, is precisely that. This inadvertently 
furthers the interests of elite power, because it puts the state beyond reproach. 
 
A credible research agenda 
 
I have shown that the reasons why state terrorism by liberal democratic states from the 
Global North is marginalised within terrorism studies, and across the social sciences, are 
numerous, and that to bring it squarely onto the agenda requires that we overcome significant 
obstacles. As discussed above, there are significant gaps in the literature that demand 
attention. These include US counterinsurgency in the Andean region, US foreign military 
training, counterinsurgency efforts as part of the ‘War on Terror’, extraordinary rendition, 
and the counter-terrorism operations of numerous liberal democratic states. Already scholars 
from various disciplines within the social sciences have developed individual research 
agendas to address some of these questions. My own work has involved a detailed analysis of 
state terrorism by the US since 1945, looking specifically at its military interventions and 
training of military forces in the Global South, and the use of torture (Blakeley 2006, 2007b). 
This work updates and extends the work begun by Chomsky and Herman (1979a, ; 1979b) in 
light of the end of the Cold War and the advent of the ‘War on Terror’. As Chomsky notes, 
the current ‘War on Terror’ is the second such war declared by a US administration 
(Chomsky 2001). The Reagan government was the first to launch a war against terrorism in 
Central and South America in the last decade of the Cold War. Another significant 
contribution will be a forthcoming monograph which explores state terrorism by Global 
North states in the Global South, in the context of their wider foreign policy objectives 
(Blakeley 2009, forthcoming). Other scholars are also engaged in ongoing research on the use 
of state terrorism by liberal democratic states. These include Jeff Sluka, who continues his 
anthropological work on state terrorism, anthropologist Glen Bowman who focuses on Israel-







communication studies is also ongoing. Developing collaborative projects may be a fruitful 
means by which to bring state terrorism to the fore in academic debate. Engaging with 
scholars from various disciplines would also enrich the research being undertaken. Insights 
from the ethnographic work undertaken by anthropologists could strengthen the analysis of 
policy by IR scholars. Psychologists and sociologists could add further dimensions on the 
effects of state terrorism on individuals and communities, and communications scholars could 
strengthen our understandings of state terrorism as portrayed and justified in the media. There 
is also scope for exploring the interaction between state violence and non-state violence. The 
argument has been made in various circles that the response by the US and its allies to 9/11, 
and subsequent actions in Iraq that were couched in terms of the ‘War on Terror’, have 
contributed to the militarisation of specific sectors of society, both in the intervened states, 
and at home. Then UK Home Secretary, John Reid, for example, quoted by The Independent 
in 2006, stated that ‘Iraq and Afghanistan did not cause terrorism. But as we are all aware, 
that does not mean to say that foreign policy is not a factor in the radicalisation of young 
people. It clearly is’ (Reid in Brown 2006). More thorough research into the relationships 
between state violence and those resisting such interventions using violent means would 
further strengthen the field. A case can also be made for developing teaching in our 
universities that addresses these issues from a range of disciplinary perspectives.           
 
A different intellectual project? 
 
Finally, Horgan and Boyle ask ‘whether there is a different intellectual project at work 
here’, where ‘the goal is to link the causes of “terrorism” to the bad behaviour of Western 
governments, capitalism or social economic inequalities’ (Horgan and Boyle 2008, p. 58). 
They state that if this is the case, the CTS project needs to be transparent. My own work does 
not focus on the causes of non-state terrorism, which in the above articulation is set up as a 
response to Western practices. I will therefore leave that question for others to address. 
Nevertheless, I, and the few other scholars that have studied state terrorism by liberal 
democratic states, have always been transparent about one of the main aims of our work, an 
explicitly normative one, which is to assess and challenge the use of coercive practices by 
liberal democratic states, particularly state terrorism, to achieve their foreign policy 
objectives in the Global South, which have included the spread of global capitalism to ensure 
access to resources and markets. In this regard the work does look specifically at the 
relationship between state terrorism and capitalism, and where relevant, pursuant social and 
economic inequalities. Specifically it is concerned with cases where liberal democratic states 
consider the use of terror by themselves or by their elite allies in the Global South to be 
functional to the achievement of their aims (Blakeley 2006, 2007b; Stokes 2005). Indeed, 
state terrorism only makes sense when we link it to the wider foreign policy objectives it is 
intended to serve.    
In my own analysis of US interventions in Latin America during the Cold War, 
declassified documents indicate that while the US publicly defended such interventions as a 
means of containing communism, there was often an underlying material imperative. 
Officials explicitly pointed to the economic threats posed to the US when left-wing 
governments were elected, and frequently stated that interventions to support repressive 
regimes would serve US capitalist interests. The coup in Argentina which saw the 
establishment of a military dictatorship from 1976 to 1982, for example, unleashed 
widespread, largely indiscriminate repression, in what became known as the Dirty War. Just 
two days after the coup, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had expressed his approval of 







“we’re going to look for a considerable effort to involve the US – particularly in the financial 
field,” and Kissinger replied, “Yes, but that’s in our interest” (Kissinger 1976). Estimates of 
the numbers of people that were killed or disappeared under the military dictatorship range 
from 9,000 to 30,000, many of whom were also tortured in Argentina’s secret detention 
centres (Amnesty International 2003). The US Embassy in Argentina had itself compiled 
documentation of nearly 10,000 human rights violations, most of them disappearances by 
1979, which it sent to the State Department “for the Department’s permanent records and 
use” (1979). Despite this knowledge, military support for the regime was ongoing. There are 
many similar examples of US sponsorship of state terrorism in Latin America during the Cold 
War, where declassified documents show just how much that support was driven by US 
efforts to protect and promote US capital (Blakeley 2009, forthcoming).   
In analysing these links, there is also an emancipatory goal. In the first instance this 
goal is to halt the use of state terrorism by exposing it. The case of the Chilean Diaspora is 
instructive. Pinochet’s regime was gradually undermined in part as a result of efforts by 
political exiles from Chile, including academics, to raise global awareness of the atrocities 
committed by the regime, resulting in its condemnation by other states (Ropp and Sikkink 
1999). This helped bring an end to the regime and to years of repression, in which The 
Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (CNCTR) found that during and 
in the years following the coup, 2,279 people were killed. Of those, 815 were victims of 
execution and death by torture, 957 disappeared following arrest, and the remainder were 
killed either as a result of war tribunals, during political protests, alleged escape attempts, or 
gun battles (CNCTR 2006) . Identifying state terrorism and raising awareness about it is one 
way that CTS scholars can assist those struggling against repression. Emancipation also 
implies that elites be dissuaded from using or sponsoring terrorism. To date this is the area in 
which the least amount of work has been undertaken by those of us studying the issue, but it 
should be afforded greater attention. State terrorism is often used or sponsored by liberal 
democratic states as a response to a perceived threat to its own interests; in Latin America 
during the Cold War the US used and sponsored terrorism as a means to counter the 
perceived threat from left-wing insurgent groups (Blakeley 2006, 2007b). As Ken Booth  
argues, ‘when powerful states use violence […] they are not acting in a manner calculated to 
make violence less likely; if they achieve success in their own terms, they do so only by 
proving to others that strategic violence can have political utility’ (Booth 2005, p. 273). This 
undermines their moral legitimacy. One of the challenges for scholars within CTS is therefore 
to challenge the perceptions of elites that consider specific groups of people to constitute 
security threats. This may help prevent violations of human rights as well as the undermining 
of states proclaiming themselves to be liberal democratic ones. The starting point is to 
explore the consequences of state terrorism, not only for victims, but for perpetrating states. 
A leading figure in France’s counter-insurgency campaign in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Jean Jacques Massu, years later admitted that the widespread use of torture, often a tool of 
state terrorism, served no useful or necessary intelligence purpose in overcoming terrorism, 
but had turned most of the Algerian population against the French, pushing them into the 
arms of the Front de Libération National (MacMaster 2004, p. 9). One priority for those 
working on state terrorism within CTS must be to critically examine state responses to threats 
that involve the use or sponsorship of state terrorism, evaluate its strategic usefulness as well 










Work begun in the 1970s and 1980s on state terrorism by liberal democratic states from 
the Global North is badly in need of updating. The call for a re-emphasis on state terrorism 
from scholars identifying with CTS does not constitute a reinventing of the wheel. Rather it 
stems from the recognition that while many scholars working on terrorism acknowledge that 
liberal democratic states have used and sponsored terrorism, few have responded to the 
challenge of undertaking research in this area. State terrorism by liberal democracies 
continues to be an elephant in the room. There are significant gaps in the literature as a result. 
Far from going over old ground, the few scholars engaged in such work are taking existing 
definitions of terrorism and using them to identify and map acts of state terrorism, and are 
then undertaking detailed analyses of the links between such incidents and the foreign policy 
objectives of the states involved, as well as their effects on human rights. In the process, new 
areas in need of further research are emerging, not least because of the foreign policy 
practices of numerous liberal democratic states engaged in the US-led ‘War on Terror’, as 
this paper has outlined. Normatively this work has three aims: to raise awareness of incidents 
of state terrorism, thereby assisting those struggling against it; to challenge existing power 
structures and institutional practices that permit the use and sponsorship of state terrorism by 
those states, including the media, policymaking and academia, which, through their own 
practices, contribute to its marginalisation from debate; and to directly call to account those 
states that use terrorism as a response to perceived security threats. The presence of 
individuals and groups of scholars undertaking work on state terrorism in various disciplines 
may be the key to overcoming two problems: the dearth of research in this area and the risk 
of unhelpful subdivisions between those identifying with CTS and other scholars of 
terrorism. Work by scholars in various social science disciplines will result in improved 
mapping of state terrorism, will enrich the analysis, and will help to focus the minds of those 
interested in state terrorism on a positive research agenda with an emancipatory aim, rather 
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